1 yoke, and it was considered not impossible that in
2 the event of any'marked success on the part of the
3 invaders, the Natives of India might, instead of
4 opposing their irruption, be ready .to join them in
5 expelling the British. The Sikhs had Certainly
6 calculated'on this kind of support.
7 Far different were our prospects in Afghanistan*,
8 the natives of which country thirsted for the blood ot
9 its invaders, and were determined to lose no oppor¬
10 tunity of revenging the injuries inhicied by the
11 British, in forcing on them a king whom they
12 despised.
13 Ifunjeet Singh, as we have shewn in the outline
14 of his warlike career, experienced sad disasters in
15 Iris first attempt at the conquest of Cashmere,
16 owing to the inclemency of the northern climate.
17 He no doubt dreaded the operation of the same
18 cause, in the event of his invading Cabul; in tact,
19 the conquest of Afghanistan was never a great
20 object of his ambition, since the country was not
21 only in itself difficult of access, and inhospitable in
22 the depth of winter, but, even if acquired, its re¬
23 sources were of too scanty a nature to render
24 their acquisition worth the risk of warfare.
25 Thought thus himself convinced of the impolicy
26 of invading Afghanistan, Runjeet did not oppose the
27 views of the British. They appeared feasible to
28 that power, and tended to secure his possessions
29 beyond the Indus. Whether lie ever contem¬
30 plated disastrous consequences may be doubtful,
31 though he was often heard to remark, that the