1 HISTORY OF THE SIKHS. 109
2 run away, but they did what in in its effect proved
3 much more injurious; they hung back, lost their Bie Nal
4 proper distances, and, instead of being side by side suielie ie
5 with the European soldiers, they got behind them ing guns.
6 and fired, often accidentally killing or wounding
7 the latter. So, far as the result of the battle of The result
8 Feerozshuhur is concerned, it would have been far fee ails
9 more eligible to have formed the whole European aac nai
10 force into one line, and left the Native regiments in and less fatal
11 reserve, and at such a distance as to prevent the ania
12 consequence of their ill-directed, though well-meant
13 fire. This point may be disputed by those partial to
14 the Native soldier; and had it been mooted before
15 the campaign with the Sikhs, the supposition we
16 have advanced would have been spurned ; but facts
17 have proved the truth and justice of our statement.
18 It is well known, that the European officers had the
19 greatest difficulty in getting their men to advance,
20 and that many threatened to cut them down. On The European
21 the night of the 21st, the fate of India depended Native corps
22 on the continued bravery of the European infantry. this.
23 Had the battle been commenced early in the day,
24 and with the troops fresh, and not fatigued by a Causes opera-
25 ting to pro-
26 long march and want of water, the conduct of the duce such ir-
27 Native troops would certainly have been far dif- the Naives,
28 ferent ; and we have heard regrets uttered by even
29 themselves, to the effect, that they could do
30 nothing—* Psiyasa aur bhook se murjata?—“ I am Their own
31 dying from want of water and food,” and concluded voces
32 by a downcast look and shrug of the shoulders,
33 “Hum kya kurne sukta!”—“1 am good for nothing.”