1 The attacking
2 party well
3 selected,
4 The advance
5 of the Tst and
6 2nd divisions.
7 Doubts re-
8 garding the
9 object of the
10 advance of the
11 centre divi-
12 sion,
13 162 HISTORY OF THE SIKIS.
14 of having been the first to enter the entrenchment,
15 and thereby to chiefly contribute to the success of
16 the attack. As regards the 59th Native infantry, we
17 had it from a gallant officer who witnessed their
18 attack, that no troops could have behaved better,
19 led as they were by their brave commander, Lieu~
20 tenant-colonel John Thompson. The 43rd Native
21 infantry, trained under the eye of the brigadier who
22 commanded the attack, had always distinguished
23 itself; and, without wishing to draw any invidious
24 distinction, a better selection could not have been
25 made for this attack, both as respects men and
26 officers.
27 We must now turn to a very important point in
28 the despatch: namely, the advance of Gilbert’s
29 division, as well as that of Sir Harry Smith. The
30 Commander-in-chief says expressly that, “ At the
31 moment of this first success, I directed Brigadier
32 the Honourable J. Ashburnham’s brigade to move
33 on in support; and Major-general Gilbert’s and Sir
34 Harry Smith’s divisions to throw out their light
35 troops to threaten the works, aided by artillery.”*
36 It is evident, that previous to the advance of the
37 Ist and 2nd divisions, and the 6th brigade, an
38 advantage or jirst success had been gained; and
39 Stacy’s brigade had driven the Sikhs into their
40 entrenchment, following at their very heels.
41 There is no word about a check, but there ap-
42 peared to be some doubt, for some moments, “ that
43 * The Commander-in-chief's despatch.