1 HISTORY OF THE SIKHS. 373
2 a
3 appeai's to have been untenable, and had he fallen
4 back earlier, his loss might have been less severe,
5 * but still, it is to be regretted, that he should have
6 been obliged to retire without being able ia so
7 doing to rejoin the main army. We are not sure
8 that it is agreeable to the tactics of war for the ©
9 reserve to push forward and take up an advanced
10 position; but if such a feat be accomplished, the
11 advantage is lost by being obliged to fall back; and
12 “had the Ist division kept its place, and supported
13 the 2nd division throughout the night, the advantage
14 would have been more conspicuous. Sir Harry
15 Smith’s refusal to march on Feerozpore, or in any
16 direction save that where he might find the Com-
17 mander-in-chief, at once shows the determined
18 courage of the General and forms a striking contrast
19 to the officer commanding the cavalry division; it
20 is true, that the latter received an order, while
21 Captain Lumley’s advice to Sir Harry Smith was
22 merely a suggestion.
23 It may be said, that the Commander-in-chief and
24 Governor-general were, in reality, at the head of
25 the portion of the army which captured the Sikh
26 guns, entered the entrenchment, and maintained
27 its position during the night of the 2ist, and that
28 Gilbert in consequence held a secondary command ;
29 yet, we are struck with the despatch of the latter,
30 and, had we not known that the Commander-in-
31 chief and the second in cqmmand were present, it
32 would have seemed that General Gilbert was really
33 the leading spirit in the affail,
34 om 2