1 CONTENTS. iii.
2 PAGE.
3 nant Biddulph’s perilous position asa prisoner.—
4 Ancedotes of the battle of Moodkee.—Tej
5 Singh’s proceedings as Commander-in-chief of
6 the Sikh army.—Forward movement of the
7 British army from Moodkee. . : a - 39—68
8 CHAPTER VI.
9 A more detailed account of the action at Moodkee,—
10 Extracts from the despatches.—The ground of
11 «the confidence of the Sikhs, in the probable suc-
12 cess of their own proceedings.—Reasons why
13 Feerozpore was not attacked.—The Mussulmans
14 and the Sikhs.—The Sikh army under Runjeet
15 Singh.—Major Broadfoot and Captain Nichol-
16 son, the political officers.—The present state of
17 the Native army.—The irregular cavalry. - 69—98
18 CHAPTER VII.
19 The disposition of the British army at Feerozshu-
20 hur.-—The battle of Feerozshuhur.—Dangerous
21 position of the British infantry, in the enemy’s
22 cémp.—Comparison between Native and Euro-
23 pean soklicrs, when deficient of water and sup-
24 *plies.—Incompleteness of the medical arrange-
25 ments in the field.—Invineibility of the British
26 bayonct:—The wounded.—Kinduess of the Go-
27 yernor-gencrul and =Commander-in-chief—Tri-
28 bute to the memory of officers killed at Feeroz-
29 shuhur. : : . : : . » 99—128