1 MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH. 487
2 understanding between the Sikh ruier and Dost Muhammad Khan, and that
3 the hostile policy of the latter chief showed that, so long as Kabul remained
4 under his government, the English Government could never hope that the
5 tranquillity of the neighbourhood of their Indian empire would be secured,
6 or its interests preserved inviolate. With a view, therefore, of arresting the
7 rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards the frontier of India,
8 ig was considered necessary to strike a decisive blow, to make a triumphant
9 march through Central Asia, and to restore Shah Shuja to the throne of his
10 ancestors as a dependent prince. The prince was, indeed, the rightful heir
11 to the Kabul throne, and his popularity throughout Afghanistan had been
12 proved by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. He
13 had, moreover, while in power, cordially acceded to the measures of united
14 resistance to external enmity that were at that time judged necessary
15 by the British Government, which, on his empire being usurped by the
16 Barakzai family, had afforded him an honourable asylum in its dominions.
17 The Barakzai chiefs were, from their disunion and unpopularity, considered
18 by the Government of India ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful
19 allies to the British Government, and to aid that Government in its just
20 and necessary measures of national defence. So long as they refrained from
21 proceedings injurious to British interest and security, that Government
22 acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared
23 to be now more than justified by the conduct of these chiefs, and to be
24 indispensable to the safety of the British empire in Hindostén. The welfare
25 of the British possessions in the East required that the British Government
26 should have on its western frontier an ally who was interested in resisting
27 aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging
28 themselves in subservience to a hostile Power and seeking to promote
29 schemes of conquest and aggrandizement. It was from these considerations
30 of justice and policy that the Government of India espoused the cause of Shah
31 Shujd-ul-Mulk. Its resolution was bold and judicious, and the vigourous
32 policy adopted worthy of the British name, The policy in question has been
33 assailed by some writers as a disastrous one ; but those who knew what pub-
34 lic opinion then was in India, and what a -mischievous effect active foreign
35 intrigue in the countries immediately bordering on India was calculated to
36 produce, notwithstanding the presence of the friendly Sikh power this side
37 of the Indus, cannot deny that the policy was the best that could, under the
38 circumstances, be adopted. The rumours of a northern invasion had been
39 diligently spread throughout India by its vanquished princes, and the whole
40 country vibrated with hopes of the ascendancy of a Power from beyond the
41 Hindu Kush. It would hardly have been wise to have allowed Russian
42 influence to be established in full vigour at the Court of Kabul at such a
43 time. Nor would it have been worthy of the position of Great Britain to
44 abandon, without reason, the cause of their ally, Mahardj4 Ranjit Singh,
45 whose sincerity towards the British Government had been established beyond
46 doubt. The Barakzai usurper of Kébul had sought the British alliance
47 against the Maharaja, a request which it was necessary emphatically to dis-
48 allow. And when the Amir openly went over to the side of Russia and
49 prepared to act in opposition to the declared policy of Government, it was
50 wisely resolved, for the sake of consistency, to show to the world that the
51 British Government was always ready to uphold a cause that was just and
52 proper, and that it could in no way allow its prestigé in India to suffer by
53 foreign machinations and- intrigues. The project was bold and honourable,
54 and there is no doubt that, had it been -steadily adhered to and subsequent
55 mistakes carefully avoided, it would have fulfilled the ends in view.
56 Amicable settlement
57 between the Maharaji
58 and the Amir consider-
59 ed impossible.
60 The Government
61 resolve to restore Shah
62 Shuja to the Kabul
63 throne.
64 Grounds for uphold-
65 ing the claims of Shah
66 Shuja.
67 The policy of the
68 British Government,
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