1 The Last Years of Ranjit Singh. 129
2 pable of controlling his Afghan subjects. Unfortu-
3 nately, Lord Auckland had his own views on the
4 situation. He had come to the conclusion that Dost
5 Muhammad was not to be trusted ; and he had
6 formed an exaggerated and altogether erroneous idea
7 of Shah Shuja's influence in Afghanistan, based en-
8 tirely on the representations of the exile himself. The
9 result was that Burnes's later efforts received very
10 cold support from Calcutta. Whether a more con-
11 ciliatory attitude at this juncture on the part of
12 the Indian Government would have induced Dost
13 Muhammad to change his tactics is a question on
14 which it is unnecessary for us to speculate. That
15 the Afghan ruler was genuinely anxious for the
16 British alliance is proved by the fact that he declared
17 himself ready to hold Peshawar as a fief of the
18 Punjab, or even to share its possession with his
19 traitorous brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan. But
20 ownership of the province, in some form or another,
21 he refused to forego, and from this determination
22 Burnes could not move him. Ranjit Singh's attitude
23 was equally uncompromising. Whatever else happened
24 to Peshawar, it should not become the property of his
25 worst enemy. Sultan Muhammad Khan might have
26 it at a price ; but Dost Muhammad, — never !
27 In March 1838 the Amir, despairing of getting
28 any satisfaction out of Lord Auckland, opened
29 negotiations with Persia and the Tzar ; Burnes was
30 recalled from Kabul in May; and before the end
31 of July a treaty had been concluded between the
32 Government of India, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja,
33 for the purpose of restoring the last named to the
34 (1,841) 9