1 The Second Sikh War. 199
2 until August, when it had become apparent that the
3 Multan revolt was spreading, and when even in
4 Lahore itself sedition was rife, that he decided that
5 active measures could no longer be delayed ; and it
6 was September 4 before the force which was
7 then dispatched — a force of 6,000 men, a third
8 of them English, with 37 guns — was encamped be-
9 fore the walls of Multan. The delay was fortunate
10 for Mulraj, for it enabled him to complete his pre-
11 parations for defence, and provided him with oppor-
12 tunities— at least we may safely conjecture that it did
13 — for a clandestine correspondence with Sher Singh.
14 The siege commenced on September 5, and
15 was carried on with varying success till the 14th,
16 when Sher Singh, with the whole of his Sikh con-
17 tingent, went over to the side of Mulraj. There was
18 nothing for it but to raise the siege, and the next
19 day the British force moved off to Surajkhund, some
20 seven miles to the south of Multan, there to await
21 the reinforcements which had already been ordered
22 up from Bombay. If any doubt yet remained as to
23 the real significance of the Multan outbreak, it was
24 effectually dispelled by the news of Sher Singh's
25 desertion. The Khalsa was up, and up not only in
26 the south-west, but in Bannu, in Peshawar, and in
27 Hazara ; and if King Ghulab Singh was not up too,
28 it was only because that astute monarch was waiting
29 till the success of the Khalsa looked a little more
30 certain.
31 The chief organizer of the risings in the north-
32 west was Chattar Singh, the father of Sher Singh,
33 who held charge of the district of Hazara; and he